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ket in which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley-
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others on the opposite side of the market, it shows that agents always find
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consume their endowments when there are altruistic agents who have con-
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essary first-order conditions for optimality are violated or because agents’
payoff functions are not concave.
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1 Introduction
We often incorporate the preferences of others in our decision making. We do so
because we intrinsically care about the welfare of other agents in the economy. In
this paper, we continue a line of inquiry begun by Dubey and Shubik (1985) and
Dufwenberg et al (2011) by investigating how altruism and spitefulness influence
equilibrium outcomes in imperfectly competitive markets.
We confine ourselves to a class of strategic market games introduced by Gab-
szewicz and Michel (1997), known as bilateral oligopolies.
1
In this two-sided market
model, agents act strategically and trade according to Shapley and Shubik (1977)’s
mechanism (henceforth, Shapley-Shubik mechanism): They submit bids and offers
to the mechanism and the price is determined by the ratio of total bids to total
offers.
The cornerstone of bilateral oligopolies is the assumption that individual agents’
behaviors are solely motivated by their personal concern. However, there is a con-
siderable amount of both experimental and empirical evidence that individuals do
not have independent preferences, in the sense that considerations of others influ-
ence individual behavior. This paper departs from the traditional assumption of
independent preferences by assuming that agents act by considering both personal
concern and concerns for the welfare of others.
By following the growing literature on behavioral economics that constructs
theoretical models with altruistic/spiteful agents (e.g., Levine, 1998; Bourle`s et al,
2017), this paper also assumes that an agent, who has a concern for others, has
an overall utility function which encompasses both his internal utility (that is, a
classical utility function defined over his consumption set) and internal utilities of
others weighted by preference parameters.
2
Each parameter reflects the degree of
importance that an agent puts on the welfare of another: positive under altruism,
negative under spitefulness and zero under the classic assumption of independent
preferences. We refer to this utility function as Edgeworth utility function (Edge-
1
This basic model of trade has been also studied by Bloch and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and
Ferrer (2001), Dickson and Hartley (2008), Amir and Bloch (2009), among others.
2
For excellent surveys see, for instance, Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Sobel (2005).
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worth, 1881).
Dufwenberg et al (2011) show that concern for others does not affect equilib-
rium outcomes when markets are perfectly competitive and agents’ preferences are
represented by Edgeworth’s utility functions. In particular, they find that agents
behave as if they had classical independent preferences at competitive equilibria.
Dubey and Shubik (1985) reach exactly the same conclusion with a continuum of
agents in a strategic market game. By contrast, we find that altruism and spiteful-
ness affect the volume of trade in bilateral oligopolies and, more interestingly, that
this type of preferences may shrink the volume of trade down to zero. This holds
even when trade produces high internal utility gains - a requirement introduced by
Bloch and Ferrer (2001) in response to the non-trade situations studied by Cordella
and Gabszewicz (1998). These findings are not in line with the conclusions reached
in auction settings (e.g., Levine, 1998; Sobel, 2010), according to which concern
for others does not affect equilibrium outcomes.
When agents have altruistic concerns for others on the same side of the market,
we provide an example of bilateral oligopoly satisfying the classical assumptions
on utility functions, as well as an assumption of high internal gains from trade, for
which the non-trade equilibrium is the unique (Nash) equilibrium.
3
The economic
intuition for this negative result is as follows. A property of the Shapley-Shubik
mechanism is that an offer by an agent produces internal utility losses for others
on the same side of the market. This translates, ceteris paribus, into a utility loss
for a supplier who intends to maximize the welfare of others on the same side of
the market. When such a loss is not compensated by a gain in his internal utility,
the altruistic supplier would prefer to offer nothing to the market.
However, we also show that a trade equilibrium exists when agents have al-
truistic concerns for others on the opposite side of the market. We obtain this
existence result under assumptions that are common in the bilateral oligopoly lit-
erature with independent preferences (e.g., Bloch and Ferrer, 2001). This positive
3
A non-trade equilibrium, also called trivial equilibrium, always exists. To study trade equi-
libria, Bloch and Ferrer (2001) introduce an assumption on marginal utilities, similar to the Inada
conditions, which implies high internal gains from trade.
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result can be explained as follows. When agents have independent preferences and
there are high gains from trade, there exists a trade equilibrium. A property of the
Shapley-Shubik mechanism is that an offer by an agent produces internal utility
gains for others on the opposite side of the market. This translates, ceteris paribus,
into utility gains for agents who have altruistic concerns for others on the opposite
side of the market. Therefore, this type of altruism strengthens the incentives to
trade and does not upset the conclusions drawn under the assumption of indepen-
dent preferences. Our new proof of existence can be used to generalize Bloch and
Ferrer (2001)’s existence result.
While there are many settings where agents are altruistic, there are also situ-
ations in which agents aim to outdo other agents in order to improve their own
standing. For this reason, we also study bilateral oligopolies with spiteful agents,
who are interested in minimizing the welfare of others as well as in maximizing
their internal utilities. In this setting, we provide examples of bilateral oligopolies,
satisfying the classical assumptions on utility functions, as well as the assump-
tion of high internal gains from trade, for which the non-trade equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium. In particular, we explore the effects of spiteful concerns both
for agents on the opposite side of the market and for those on the same side of the
market. Although spitefulness is detrimental to the existence of trade equilibria,
we find that these negative effects are caused by two distinct factors.
In a setting where agents aim to minimize the welfare of others on the opposite
side of the market, the non-existence of trade equilibria stems from the fact that in
the Shapley-Shubik mechanism an offer by an agent produces internal utility gains
for others on the opposite side of the market. This translates, ceteris paribus, into
a utility loss for a supplier who intend to minimize the welfare of others on the
opposite of the market. When such a loss is not compensated by a gain in his
internal utility, a spiteful supplier would prefer to offer nothing to the market.
By contrast, in a setting where agents aim to minimize the welfare of others on
the same side of the market, we report that the non-existence is due to the non-
concavity of the payoff functions.
Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and outlines the bilateral oligopoly
4
model, with results presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. The appendix con-
tains the proof of existence.
2 Mathematical model
We consider exchange economies with two types of agents, labelled 1 and 2, and two
(perfectly divisible) commodities, labelled x and y. The set of agents is I = I1∪I2,
where I
t
is the finite set of agents of type t = 1, 2. An agent i is of type 1 when he is
endowed with x
0
i > 0 units of commodity x but no unit of commodity y. Similarly,
an agent i is of type 2 when he is endowed with y
0
i > 0 units of commodity y but no
unit of commodity x. Therefore, agents of different types are on different sides of
the market as they hold different commodities. We make the following assumption
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 There are at least two agents for each type.
Agent i’s bundle (xi, yi) is a (non-negative) two-dimensional vector describing
how much of each commodity he consumes. An allocation (x, y) = (xi, yi)i∈I is a
list of bundles. Each agent i maximizes the utility function:
Vi (x, y) = ui(xi, yi) +∑
j≠i
γ
j
i uj(xj, yj),
where −1 ≤ γji ≤ 1 for each agent j ≠ i.
4
Agent i’s utility function embodies
a private and a social component. The private component is represented by the
internal utility ui that depends on commodities that go directly to him. The social
component is instead represented by the weighted sum of the internal utilities of
other agents. Each parameter γ
j
i is the weight that agent i put on agent j’s utility,
positive under altruism, negative under spitefulness, and zero under independent
preferences. Let γi = (γji )j∈I , with γii = 1, denote agent i’s preference parameters.
The following classical assumption on internal utilities is made.
4
Edgeworth (1881) calls the parameter γ
j
i ≥ 0 coefficient of effective sympathy. See Levine
(1988) for a discussion on the different interpretations of γ
j
i .
5
Assumption 2 For each agent i ∈ I, the internal utility ui is continuous, contin-
uously differentiable,
5
strictly increasing and concave.
By following the approach developed by Bloch and Ferrer (2001), we consider
bilateral oligopolies in which there are high internal gains from trade, i.e., high
gains from trade with respect to internal utility functions.
6
This is captured by
the following assumption.
Assumption 3 There exists an agent i ∈ I1 such that ∂ui(xi,0)
∂yi
=∞, for each xi > 0,
or an agent i ∈ I2 such that ∂ui(0,yi)
∂xi
=∞, for each yi > 0.
Since the set of agents will remain fixed, an exchange economy with altruis-
tic/spiteful agents is denoted by (u, γ, w) where u = (ui)i∈I is the profile of internal
utilities, γ = (γi)i∈I is the profile of agents’ profile of preference parameters, and
w = (x0i , y0i )i∈I is the endowment profile. An exchange economy in which agents
have independent preferences is simply denoted by (u,w).
In our model, agents behave strategically: each agent offers a quantity of his
endowment to the market. The strategy spaces are thus given by:
Si = {ai ∶ 0 ≤ ai ≤ x0i } , for each i ∈ I1,
Si = {bi ∶ 0 ≤ bi ≤ y0i } , for each i ∈ I2.
We write (a, b) for the profile of offers ((ai)i∈I1 , (bi)i∈I2) and S for ∏
i∈I
Si. Clearly,(a, b) is an element of S. Additionally, (a−i, b) is an element of ∏
j≠i
Sj, with i ∈ I
1
,
and (a, b−i) is an element of ∏
j≠i
Sj, with i ∈ I
2
. For any profile of offers (a, b) ∈ S,
the bundles assigned to agents are given by the following allocation rule:
(xi (a, b) , yi (a, b)) = (x0i − ai, aiBA ) , for each i ∈ I1, (1)
(xi (a, b) , yi (a, b)) = (biAB, y0i − bi) , for each i ∈ I2, (2)
5
Differentiability should be implicitly understood to include the case of infinite partial deriva-
tives along the boundary of the consumption set (see Kreps (2012), p. 58.)
6
Bloch and Ferrer (2001) assume that the restriction on marginal utilities holds for both
commodities and for all agents.
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if A = ∑
i∈I1
ai > 0 and B = ∑i∈I2 bi > 0. Otherwise, each agent consumes only
his own endowment. The ratio B/A is the price of commodity x, whereas the
price of y is normalized to 1. The allocation generated by (a, b) is denoted by(x (a, b) , y (a, b)).
The above allocation rule combined with (S, u, γ) defines a bilateral oligopoly
with altruistic and spiteful agents, which is denoted by Γ(γ). We write Γ to denote
a bilateral oligopoly where agents have independent preferences. We adopt the
solution concept of (Nash) equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium for Γ (γ) is a profile of offers (aˆ, bˆ) such that:
• For each agent i ∈ I1, aˆi ∈ Si maximizes:
Vi (x ((ai, aˆ−i) , bˆ) , y ((ai, aˆ−i) , bˆ)) .
• For each agent i ∈ I2, bˆi ∈ Si maximizes:
Vi (x (aˆ, (bi, bˆ−i)) , y (aˆ, (bi, bˆ−i))) .
Let (aˆ, bˆ) be an equilibrium for Γ (γ). The profile (aˆ, bˆ) is a non-trade equilibrium
for Γ (γ) if Aˆ = 0 and Bˆ = 0. The non-trade equilibrium always exists. The profile(aˆ, bˆ) is a trade equilibrium for Γ (γ) if Aˆ > 0 and Bˆ > 0.
3 Altruistic agents
We start our analysis by considering altruistic agents who are characterized by
positive preference parameters. They aim to maximize their internal utilities as
well as the welfare of other agents.
Let us start considering the case where agents have altruistic concerns for others
on the opposite side of the market. In such a context, a trade equilibrium always
exists as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem Let (u, γ, w) be an exchange economy satisfying Assumptions 1-3. For
each agent i ∈ I t, let γi be such that γ
j
i = 0 for each j ∈ I
t\ {i} and γji ≥ 0 for each
j ∈ I\I t, for each t = 1, 2. Then, there exists a trade equilibrium for Γ (γ).
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The proof can be found in the appendix and it adopts techniques which are
similar to the ones used by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and Bloch and Ferrer (2001).
The main novelty is the way in which the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem is used to show
that there is trade in equilibrium. Furthermore, we can obtain the following corol-
lary which generalizes the existence result obtained by Bloch and Ferrer (2001) for
bilateral oligopolies with independent preferences.
Corollary Let (u,w) be an exchange economy satisfying Assumptions 1-3. Then,
there exists a trade equilibrium for Γ.
The proof follows immediately from the theorem when γi is set equal to zero
for all agents.
We now turn to the case where agents have altruistic concerns for others on
the same side of the market. In sharp contrast to the previous result, we show, by
means of an example, that a trade equilibrium may fail to exist, though agents’
internal utilities satisfy Assumptions 2-3. This non-existence result is due to the
negativity of the necessary first-order conditions for optimality.
Example 1. Consider an exchange economy with four agents having the following
utility functions and endowments:
V1(x, y) = 23x1 + y1 + 12 (23x2 + 2y2) and (x01, y01) = (4, 0),
V2(x, y) = 23x2 + 2y2 and (x02, y02) = (4, 0),
Vi(x, y) = √xi + yi and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 4), for i = 3, 4.
Note that agents’ internal utilities satisfy Assumptions 2-3. Also, note that agent
1 has an altruistic concern for agent 2. By checking the necessary first-order condi-
tions for optimality, it is straightforward to verify that the non-trade equilibrium is
the unique equilibrium of the Γ(γ) associated with the aforesaid exchange economy.
The reason behind this non-existence result can be explained as follows. From
the allocation rule (1), the final quantity of the commodity y assigned to agent 2
depends negatively on the quantity of x offered by agent 1. Therefore, if agent 1’s
gain from consuming additional units of commodity y does not outweigh his loss
8
from a decrease in agent 2’s consumption of y, then agent 1 maximizes his payoff
by reducing his offer a1 to zero. This can be seen by considering the derivative of
the payoff function of agent 1 with respect to his offer a1, which can be stated as
follows:
∂V1
∂a1
= −
∂u1
∂x1
+
∂u1
∂y1
B
A2
a2 − γ
2
1 (∂u2∂y2 BA2a2) .
By substituting the marginal utilities of agents 1 and 2 as well as agent 1’s prefer-
ence parameter γ
2
1 = 12 of Example 1, one can easily verify that the above derivative
is negative and then agent 1’s best strategy is a1 = 0. It is well know that in the bi-
lateral oligopoly model we have a trade equilibrium only when there are two agents
offering each commodity.
7
Since in our example agent 1’s best offer is always nil,
the non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
4 Spiteful agents
We now consider bilateral oligopolies with spiteful agents. Such agents are char-
acterized by negative preference parameters and they aim to minimize the welfare
of other agents in the economy. Although there are high internal gains from trade,
we show, by means of examples, that a trade equilibrium may fail to exist when
there are spiteful agents.
We first turn to the case where agents have spiteful concerns for others on the
opposite side of the marker. In such a case, the non-existence of a trade equilibrium
is due to the negativity of the necessary first-order conditions for optimality.
Example 2. Consider an exchange economy with four agents having the following
utility functions and endowments:
Vi(x, y) = 23xi + yi − 12 (√x3 + y3) − 12 (√x4 + y4) and (x0i , y0i ) = (4, 0), for i = 1, 2,
Vi(x, y) = √xi + yi and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 4), for i = 3, 4.
7
When a1 = 0, the allocation rule (1) implies that agent 2 can increase his utility by decreasing
his offers of commodity x because for any a2 he gets all the amount B of commodity y offered in
the market. In such a case the agent 2’s payoff function is not continuous on S2 and he does not
have a best strategy.
9
Note that agents’ internal utilities satisfy Assumptions 2-3. Also, note that agents
1 and 2 have spiteful concerns for agents 3 and 4. It is possible to verify that the
non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the Γ(γ) associated with the
aforesaid exchange economy.
8
The intuition behind this non-existence result can be explained as follows. From
the allocation rule (2) the final quantities of commodity x assigned to agents 3 and
4 depend positively on the quantity x offered by agents 1 and 2. Therefore, if agent
1’s gain from consuming additional units of commodity y does not outweigh his
loss from an increase in agents 3 and 4’ consumption of commodity x, then agent
1 may maximizes his payoff by reducing his offer a1 to zero. This can also be seen
by considering the derivative of the payoff function of agent 1 with respect to his
offer, which can stated as follows:
∂V1
∂a1
= −
∂u1
∂x1
+
∂u1
∂y1
B
A2
a2 + γ
3
1 (∂u3∂x3 b3B ) + γ41 (∂u4∂x4 b4B ) .
Heuristically, if γ
3
1 and γ
4
1 are high enough, then agent 1’s best strategy is a1 = 0.
9
The same argument applies to agent 2. We thus conclude that there is no strategy
profile that can satisfy the necessary first-order conditions for optimality, and so
the non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of Γ (γ).
We finally turn to the case where agents have spiteful concerns for others on the
same side of the market. In such a case, the non-existence of a trade equilibrium
is due to the non-concavity of payoff functions.
Example 3. Consider an exchange economy with four agents having the following
utility functions and endowments:
V1(x, y) = 23x1 + y1 − 12 (x2 − y−22 ) and (x01, y01) = (4, 0),
V2(x, y) = x2 − y−22 and (x02, y02) = (4, 0),
Vi(x, y) = √xi + yi and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 4), for i = 3, 4.
8
This can be verified by solving the necessary first order condition for optimality with any
computer algebra system.
9
Recall that γ
j
i < 0 under spitefulness.
10
Note that the internal utilities of agents satisfy Assumptions 2-3.
10
Also note that
only agent 1 has spiteful concern for agent 2. It is possible to verify that the
non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the Γ(γ) associated with the
aforesaid exchange economy.
In the example the strategy profile (aˆ1, aˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4) = (3.097, 3.673, 0.460, 0.460)
is the unique solution to the necessary first-order conditions for optimality of all
agents.
11
However, this profile does not correspond to an equilibrium because
agent 1 can find a unilateral profitable deviation. Indeed, the figure below shows
the shape of agent 1’s payoff function when other agents offer (aˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4). It is
immediate to see that agent 1’s payoff function is convex and aˆ1 corresponds to
a minimum point. Therefore, (aˆ1, aˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4) cannot be an equilibrium, and so the
non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of Γ(γ).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a bilateral
oligopoly. We prove that a trade equilibrium exists when agents have altruistic
concerns for others on the opposite side of the market. The intuition behind this
10
The internal utility function of agent 2 is not defined on the boundary of the consumption
set. This does not affect the current analysis but should be kept in mind. Examples with an
internal utility function defined also on the boundary can be found, e.g., V2(x, y) = x2−( 110 +y2)−2.
11
This can be verified with any computer algebra system
11
positive result is that incentives to trade are strengthened under this configura-
tion of altruistic concerns. By contrast, we show, by means of examples, that the
non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in all other cases analyzed. These
negative results are caused by the negativity of the necessary first-order condi-
tions for optimality (as in Examples 1 and 2) and by the non-concavity of payoff
functions (as in Example 3).
Before closing the paper, we wish to call attention to two points. First, we con-
fine ourself to bilateral oligopolies with corner endowments in one commodity. We
do not know whether our negative results extend to models with interior endow-
ments. This is left for further research. Second, as in Dubey and Shubik (1985),
one can show that the equilibrium of a bilateral oligopoly corresponds to the com-
petitive equilibrium when there is a continuum of altruistic and spiteful agents.
However, we still do not know whether the equilibrium of a bilateral oligopoly
converges to the competitive equilibrium when the underlying exchange economy
-with altruistic and spiteful agents- is replicated. The reason for this is that the
standard convergence results do not apply (e.g., Lemma 4 of Dubey and Shubik,
1978), even when there exists a trade equilibrium. This is a fruitful research area
for future works.
A Appendix
The proof of the existence theorem is based on three lemmas which require the
following preliminary result.
Proposition Let Assumption 2 hold. For each agent i ∈ I t, let γi be such that
γ
j
i = 0 for each j ∈ I
t\ {i} and γji ≥ 0, for each j ∈ I\I t, for each t = 1, 2. Then, the
utility function Vi is continuous, monotone, and concave, for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Consider the utility function Vi of an agent i. It is straightforward to
verify that Vi is continuous, monotone, and concave as it is a sum of continuous,
monotone, and concave internal utility functions by Assumption 2.
Following Dubey and Shubik (1978), in order to prove the existence of a (Nash)
12
equilibrium, we introduce a perturbed game Γ
(γ), with  ∈ (0, 1]. This is a game
defined as Γ(γ) with the only exception that in the allocation rules (1) and (2)
the ratio B
A
is replaced by B+
A+
, i.e., the price of commodity x becomes B+
A+
. The
interpretation is that an outside agency places a fixed bid of  and a fixed offer
of  in the trading post. This does not change the strategy sets of agents, but
does affect the prices, the final holdings, and the payoffs. We denote by (aˆ, bˆ) an
equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ
(γ).
In the first lemma, we prove the existence of an equilibrium in the perturbed
game.
Lemma 1 Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. For each  ∈ (0, 1], there exists an equilibrium
for Γ
(γ).
Proof. Consider an agent i of type 1 and fix the strategies (a−i, b) for all other
agents. In the perturbed game the payoff function Vi(x(a, b), y(a, b)) is continuous
as B+
A+
is positive for each  ∈ (0, 1]. Let
φi(a−i, b) ∈ argmax
ai∈Si
Vi(x(a−i, b), y(a−i, b))
be the best response correspondence of the agent i. By the Weierstrass Theorem,
the best response correspondence φi is non-empty. We now show that the corre-
spondence φi has convex-valued. Suppose that there are two feasible strategies a
′
i
and a
′′
i which belong to φi(a−i, b). We need to prove that a˜i = δa′i + (1 − δ)a′′i , with
δ ∈ (0, 1), belongs to φi(a−i, b). Since the strategies (a−i, b) are fixed, let us con-
sider (x(a, b), y(a, b)) as functions of ai, i.e., (x(ai), y(ai)). Let (x′, y′) = (x(a′i), y(a′i)),(x′′, y′′) = (x(a′′i ), y(a′′i )), and (x˜, y˜) = δ(x′, y′)+ (1−δ)(x′′, y′′). Since the utility function
Vi is concave, by the Proposition,
Vi(x˜, y˜) ≥ δVi(x′, y′) + (1 − δ)Vi(x′′, y′′) = Vi(x′, y′).
From the allocation rules (1) and (2), we have that xi(a˜i) = x˜i, as xi(ai) is linear;
yi(a˜i) ≥ y˜i, as yi(ai) is concave; and xj(a˜i) = x˜j, yj(a˜i) = y˜j, as xj(ai) and yj(ai) are
linear, for each j ∈ I2. But then,
Vi(x(a˜i), y(a˜i)) ≥ Vi(x˜, y˜) = Vi(x′, y′) = Vi(x(a′), y(a′)),
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as Vi is monotone. Thus, a˜i maximizes agent i’s payoff function and then it belongs
to φi(a−i, b). Therefore, the correspondence φi has convex-valued. Furthermore, by
the Berge Maximum Theorem, φi is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. If
we consider an agent i ∈ I2, then the previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to
the same result and φi(a, b−i) is a non-empty, convex-valued, upper hemicontinuous
correspondence. As we are looking for a fixed point in the strategy space S,
let’s consider φi ∶ S → Si. Let Φ ∶ S → S such that Φ(S) = ∏i∈I φi(S). The
correspondence Φ is a convex-valued and upper hemicontinuous because it is a
product of convex-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondences. Moreover, S is
a compact and convex set. Therefore, by the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, there
exists a fixed point (aˆ, bˆ) of Φ, which is an equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ.
In the next lemma, we prove that the price of commodity x is finite and bounded
away from zero at an equilibrium of any perturbed game.
Lemma 2 At an equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ
(γ), (aˆ, bˆ), there exist two
positive constants C and D, independent from , such that
C < Bˆ
 + 
Aˆ + 
< D,
for each  ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the proof provided by Dubey and Shubik
(1978) still holds. To establish the existence of C, consider an agent i of type
2. Following the same steps adopted by Dubey and Shubik (1978), after having
applied the Uniform Monotonicity Lemma, we still obtain the following relationship
on internal utility functions (see p. 10 in Dubey and Shubik (1978)),
ui(xi(∆), yi(∆)) > ui(xi(aˆ, bˆ), yi(aˆ, bˆ)).
The parameter ∆ is a feasible increase in agent i strategy and (xi(∆), yi(∆)) is the
new corresponding bundle. Note that
∑
j∈I1
uj(xj(∆), yj(∆)) > ∑
j∈I1
uj(xj(aˆ, bˆ), yj(aˆ, bˆ))
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as uj is increasing in y, for each j ∈ I
1
, by Assumption 2. From the two previous
inequalities and since γ
j
i = 0, for each j ∈ I
2\ {i}, and γji ≥ 0, for each j ∈ I1, we
obtain that
Vi(x(∆), y(∆)) > Vi(x(aˆ, bˆ), y(aˆ, bˆ)).
Since (aˆ, bˆ) is an equilibrium, we obtain the same contradiction of Dubey and
Shubik (1978). By following their steps, we can then show that Bˆ
+
Aˆ+
> C. To
establish the existence of D, consider an agent i of type 1. Then, the previous
argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to Bˆ
+
Aˆ+
< D.
In the next lemma we use the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem to show that the agent
satisfying Assumption 3 places a positive offer at an equilibrium of any perturbed
game. This lemma is crucial to prove that there exists a trade equilibrium for Γ(γ).
Lemma 3 At an equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ
(γ), (aˆ, bˆ), there exists two
positive constants α and β, independent from , such that
α ≤ Aˆ or β ≤ Bˆ,
for each  ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Let (aˆ, bˆ) be an equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(γ). We first consider
the case in which there exists an agent i ∈ I1 who satisfies Assumption 3. Then,
aˆ

i solves the following maximization problem
max
ai
Vi(x((ai, aˆ−i), bˆ), y((ai, aˆ−i), bˆ)),
subject to ai ≤ x
0
i , (i)
− ai ≤ 0. (ii)
By the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, there exist non-negative multipliers λˆi and µˆi such
that
∂Vi
∂ai
»»»»»»»(aˆ,bˆ) − λˆi + µˆi = 0, (3)
λˆi(aˆi − x0i ) = 0,
µˆiaˆ

i = 0.
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Equation (3) can be written as
−
∂ui
∂xi
»»»»»»»(aˆ,bˆ) + ∂ui∂yi »»»»»»»(aˆ,bˆ) Bˆ + Aˆ +  (1 − aˆiAˆ + )
+ ∑
j∈I2
γ
j
i
∂uj
∂yj
»»»»»»»»(aˆ,bˆ) bˆ

j
Bˆ + 
− λˆi + µˆi = 0.
Note that the summation over j ∈ I2 is non-negative as the internal utility functions
uj are increasing, by Assumption 2, and γ
j
i ≥ 0, by the assumption of the theorem,
for each j ∈ I2. Furthermore, the multiplier µˆi is non-negative, by the Kuhn-Tucker
Theorem, and Bˆ+
Aˆ+
≥ C, by Lemma 2. But then, from the previous equation we
can derive the following inequality which must hold in equilibrium
−
∂ui
∂xi
»»»»»»»(aˆ,bˆ) + ∂ui∂yi »»»»»»»(aˆ,bˆ)C(Aˆ − aˆi + Aˆ +  ) − λˆi ≤ 0. (4)
Suppose now that ai → 0. Then, we have that
∂ui
∂yi
→ ∞, as ∂ui(xi,0)
∂yi
= ∞ by As-
sumption 3,
Aˆ
−aˆi+
Aˆ+
→ 1, and λˆ
1
i = 0, as constraint (i) is not binding for sufficiently
small ai. Furthermore,
∂ui
∂xi
has an upper bound, as xi > 0 and ui is continuously
differentiable in the interior of the consumption set by Assumption 2. But then,
there exists an α > 0, independent of , such that the left hand side of equation
(4) is positive for each ai ∈ [0, α]. Hence, since the inequality (4) must hold in
equilibrium, aˆ

i > α, and, a fortiori, 0 < α < Aˆ

, for each  ∈ (0, 1]. We now consider
the case in which there exists an agent i ∈ I2 who satisfies Assumption 3. Then,
the previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to 0 < β < Bˆ, for each  ∈ (0, 1].
We can now prove the existence theorem.
Proof. Consider a sequence of {l}l converging to 0. By Lemma 1, in each per-
turbed game there exists an equilibrium. Then, we can consider a sequence of
equilibria {(aˆl , bˆl)}l. Since S is compact and Bˆn+nAˆn+n ∈ [C,D], by Lemma 2, we
can pick a subsequence of {(aˆl , bˆl)}l that converge to (aˆ, bˆ) such that (aˆ, bˆ) ∈ S and
Bˆ
Aˆ
∈ [C,D]. But then, the strategy profile (aˆ, bˆ) is a point of continuity of payoff
functions and then it is an equilibrium of Γ(γ). The result of Lemma 3 implies
that Aˆ > 0 or Bˆ > 0. But then, since Bˆ
Aˆ
∈ [C,D], we can conclude that Aˆ > 0 and
Bˆ > 0. Hence, (aˆ, bˆ) is a trade equilibrium.
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